Is Kenya’s president safe in a crowd? Security expert scans VIP protection checklist

Nairobi. Protecting any president requires multiple layers of intelligence, physical security and rapid response security protocols. Exact operational details are classified, but there are global best practices in VIP protection.

The issue of presidential protection in Kenya has become particularly relevant following an incident in early May 2025 when someone in a crowd threw a shoe at President William Ruto during a public event, hitting his hand.

I have studied policing and security policies in Kenya for over 15 years, interacting closely with the country’s security protocols.

In my view this incident exposed several critical security lapses around the elite officers tasked with protecting the president.

The security of the president is a critical issue in Kenya. The country is exposed to terror groups like the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab and other criminal networks in the region.

In 2021, a businessman embedded himself into the presidential motorcade and drove into then president Uhuru Kenyatta’s official residence. 

In 2017, an unidentified man who was said to have illegally accessed the highly protected state house grounds was shot dead by presidential guards.

There are multiple layers to Kenya’s protection protocols. They include National Intelligence Service officers, the Kenya Defence Force, Presidential Escort Police officers drawn from the highly trained General Service Unit, bomb disposal experts and regular police officers. Their deployment depends on the nature of the presidential engagement.

While the shoe incident may be passed off as simply embarrassing, it should serve as a wake-up call to tighten security protocols around the president without necessarily compromising his public engagement with citizens.

What’s in place

Prior to any presidential visit across the country, security teams conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the destination. This includes coordinating with local policing agencies, clearing airspace, mapping secure transport routes and identifying nearby medical facilities in case of emergencies.

Presidential motorcade routes are pre-planned and a dry run is made. This often includes mapping alternative routes to avoid predictability should there be assailants along a presidential route. It is common to see some roads temporarily closed and security officers conducting sweeps for any threats or explosives. In areas deemed high risk, counter security sniper teams are covertly deployed in strategic areas.

Cases of attacks on presidential motorcades are rare in Kenya. However, in 2002 during presidential campaigns, angry opposition supporters stoned then president Daniel Moi’s motorcade. In November 2021, an angry mob hurled rocks at then deputy president Ruto’s motorcade.

The National Intelligence Service and Presidential Escort Unit covertly scout locations in advance, assessing potential security vulnerabilities. Crowd sizes, and entry and exit points for the head of state are mapped out in advance.

In cases where meetings are held in town halls or huge tents, attendees are screened using metal detectors and/or physical searches. Uniformed and plainclothes security officers embed themselves in the crowd to monitor any threats.

The president and any dignitaries accompanying him have at least three layers of security.

The inner ring consists of close protection officers who are always within an arm’s length of the president to physically thwart any threats. The middle ring has armed security guards who watch for, among others, sudden movements and abnormal behaviour within the crowd. The outer ring consists of regular police and paramilitary units from the General Service Unit who secure the outside perimeter.

The presidential motorcade is a coordinated convoy of heavily armoured vehicles. It includes lead and chase cars, communication units and emergency response teams. Traffic is managed by local traffic police officers to ensure unobstructed movement. Routes are kept confidential until necessary.

The president’s security may opt to use a decoy vehicle if there is a security threat, to confuse and derail potential risk sources. In all these cases, there is a contingent of specialised General Service Unit officers, called the Recce unit, that always accompanies the president.

Kenya’s presidential security precautions follow standard VIP security protection like those for heads of state across the world. However, in some neighbouring countries, for instance, presidents move in heavily armed military convoys. This has not been seen in Kenya.

If a potential threat is detected, the president is immediately shielded and whisked away to a secure vehicle or evacuated by air in high-risk events. In such cases, the Kenya Defence Forces secures the president.

Despite stringent security measures, incidents can occur. For instance, in March 2025, a British tourist was fatally hit by a vehicle in Ruto’s motorcade. This prompted investigations and reviews on motorcade safety protocols.

Such events highlight the challenges of balancing presidential security with public safety, especially in densely populated urban areas.

Security failures

The shoe-throwing incident targeting Ruto highlighted five major failures in presidential protection protocols.

First, crowd screening and access control failures. The alleged assailant was very close to the president, suggesting an inadequate distance between the crowds and the president. The inner ring of security also failed to spot the perpetrator raising a shoe in the air to use as a projectile. This indicates weak front-row eye sweeps and scans by the president’s security.

Second, there was an apparent delay in security response. The elite officers around the president should have subdued the alleged attacker within seconds. It could mean most had their eyes on the president or cameras, as opposed to scanning the crowds for any sudden movements.

Third, security allowed the president to stand too close to a crowd that hadn’t been screened. Best practices require a no-go zone of three to five metres for individuals who have not been scanned or screened.

Fourth, there was an apparent gap in intelligence and threat assessment. Aggressive or agitated people next to the president should draw the attention of security officers. Plainclothes security officers are usually deployed to monitor crowd behaviour. It isn’t enough to rely on uniformed officers.

Undercover agents are critical for flagging pre-attack signals, such as nervousness or repeated adjustments of positions.

Fifth, there was no clear evacuation plan for the president. After the incident, the president continued speaking. In high-risk scenarios, protocols often demand instant relocation of the president to a secure vehicle or helicopter, where the military takes over and airlifts him to safety.

What should change

Kenya’s presidential security detail may be forced to:

•             increase standoff distance between the president and crowds

•             deploy more plainclothes officers to blend in and monitor crowds around the president

•             mandate stricter screening of those in close proximity to the president

•             conduct more frequent security risks drills for rapid neutralisation of potential threats.

The exact details of presidential security in Kenya are confidential. However, the overarching structure aims to provide comprehensive protection to the president while maintaining public safety and order during official engagements. No security protocol is 100% foolproof. But a balance needs to be struck between overly aggressive crowd control and accessibility.

About the Author: Douglas Lucas Kivoi is a Principal Policy Analyst, Governance Department, The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)