Exposed: Kenya’s arms in Sudan war

“There are two generals that have no regard for human life.The war in Sudan is heading towards carnage. It is already in the realm of a human catastrophe. All levers need to be pulled regionally and globally to stop the carnage, the human suffering and the tragedy that is unfolding in Sudan.”

These were President William Ruto’s words on May 31, 2025 at a media briefing at State House, Nairobi. He spoke as he hosted Slovenian President Nataša Pirc Musar, and went on to list the various conflicts in neighbouring countries and how Kenya was involved in mediation efforts.

At the height of the battle for Khartoum in 2023, Kenya was involved in mediation, with Dr Ruto being appointed the chairman of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) Quartet of Heads of States on Sudan.

He met with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who was appointed the President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council following the 2019 Sudanese coup d'état, in November 2023 at State House, Nairobi.

Then in January 2024, he met with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, alias Hemedti, the former Deputy Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council of Sudan, and the current head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in Nairobi.

It was a closed-door meeting that ended with President Ruto saying he “appreciated the commitment by the RSF and its leader (Hemedti) in ending the conflict in Sudan through dialogue.”

In January 2025, the US sanctioned Hemedti for orchestrating genocide, ethnic cleansing, and obstructing humanitarian aid in the ongoing Sudan civil war.

But a six-month long Nation investigation in collaboration with Bellingcat can now reveal that Kenya may be involved in the war in Sudan, not in efforts to try and end it, but by possibly arming one side— the RSF.

In a video posted on X on May 23, 2025, SAF soldiers and pro-SAF militants are seen rummaging through dark rooms in a depot abandoned by RSF fighters. In it, there are piles of wooden crates and green boxes.

The Sudanese soldiers celebrate their seizure of the arsenal, and in their message to the RSF, they say, "how could you escape and leave behind such a large quantity of weapons?"

A closer look at the packaging of the arms cache reveals something shocking: The word “KENYA” appears written on the crates and the boxes.

Important questions emerge. Where were these videos taken? And who took them?

Media reports highlight that there were raids conducted by the SAF in Omdurman, the second most populous city in Sudan located on the west bank of River Nile — some 10 kilometres northwest of Khartoum. This is consistent with the captions and time the videos were posted online.

On May 20, al-Burhan, the Sudanese Army General, in a statement said the State of Khartoum— which comprises the capital Khartoum, the city of Omdurman, and the city of Khartoum North — was now free of RSF fighters.

This is among the many victories the SAF have secured since they started their offensive early this year to take over places that had fallen under RSF control since the war broke out in 2023.

Salha area was the last remaining RSF stronghold in the state, and was home to the group’s largest military bases.

But how exactly do we know these crates and boxes are in Khartoum?

We analysed more videos, particularly Video 2, video 3, to reveal key details.

These were among the many videos posted by pro-SAF accounts that are now coming out of Salha, also known as Al Salha, a neighborhood in Omdurman, within Khartoum State. It lies approximately 10.8 kilometres from central Khartoum.

The videos, which appear to have been filmed in the same room, show that the crates of ammunition could have been held in an underground depot, by looking at the direction of the light and the positioning of the windows.

This is consistent with the videos from a media report which highlight that the raid was conducted in a building with a basement.

Another way to show that these crates of ammunition are in Khartoum is through the people in the videos.

The first video shows a bald-headed man inside the depot wearing a military t-shirt, glasses and white Tasbih prayer beads.

We analysed another outdoor footage showing what appears to be the same military man wearing the same clothes and accessories. Elements in the background depict the footage was indeed filmed in Salha, Omdurman, along the main road (15.5479, 32.4273).

Moreover, the video has Omdurman in its caption, which is consistent with the locations of the other motion pictures filmed and posted around the same time— including those in media reports.

To identify the soldier above, we analysed another video that was circulating on May 20. In the video, he appears in military uniform with insignias consistent with the rank of Major (Ra’id) in the Sudan Armed Forces and a badge belonging to Sudan’s General Intelligence Service.

The uniform also bears his name in Arabic, which can be translated to “Al-Makki Abdul Quddus Ahmed”.

Further analysis of his social media accounts shows Al-Makki is actively involved in Sudanese combat operations.

We identified a second man seen in the depot video standing next to the crates of ammunition.

By singling out a white logo on his T-shirt and a small Sudanese flag on his left shoulder, we were able to match the young-faced soldier to an outdoor footage.

Our analysis also confirmed the footage showing the young-faced man was filmed approximately 150 metres from Major Al-Makki’s location (the bald guy), here (15.546947, 32.427022).

A further search for his identity yielded a Facebook profile that further shows he most likely lives in Sudan.

These two soldiers helped to place the crates of ammunition seen in the videos in Sudan as they are all based in the country and specifically, they all posted on social media while in the Salha area just after SAF regained control of the area.

While we could not verify the depot's exact location, the presence of soldiers in the Salha area, supported by open-source evidence, strongly suggests that the depot is located in Salha, Omdurman, in the warring Sudan.

But what is in these crates of ammunition?

Our investigation first analysed crates of ammunition in the photos posted by pro-SAF accounts from Khartoum during the early stages of the offensive in March 2025.

Comparing the labels to those in the videos from the recaptured depot in Salha, we could see that all the crates bore similar markings.

They are written in black and the labelling indicates the name of the product, contract number, batch number, volume, case number, and total case number.

We spoke in confidence to a senior ammunition expert and shared the images of crates of the ammunitions.

He noted that the label “CONTRACT NO.23PTI/KEMOD-01/KENYA” indicates that both crates of ammunition are part of the same contract (No. 23PTI) and were delivered to Kenya’s Ministry of Defence (KEMOD-01).

He, however, noted that there is no marking on the crates, which can identify the manufacturer of the cartridges.

“Bear in mind that the above calibres are non-NATO calibres, which means they were unlikely to have been manufactured in the West,” he said.

“The wooden crates and stenciled labelling are consistent with those used by Russian, Eastern European, Chinese, or North Korean ammunition manufacturers.”

The ammunition expert also noted that based on the crate photos, three lot numbers are visible - 001, 002, and 005-24. These markings suggest the ammunition was likely delivered in 2024, at a time when the civil war in Sudan was already ongoing.

The type of ammunition in the crates is specified on the labels as 14.5 x 114 MM API cartridges.

One of the videos we found with these crates inside a depot in Salha, Omdurman, showed cans inside the crates and at least one open can next to the crates had visible ammunition consistent with the specs on the label.

The visible ammunition appears to be in a green casing, with a standard black tip. More details like production date, headstamp, or identifying markings on the container are necessary to figure out its origin.

Our investigation was also able to identify two additional green boxes seen in a video showing the Salha depot.

The label appears to indicate the contents of the boxes are explosive materials with the specification “82mm HE Mortar Bomb Type PP87”.

According to the munitions expert, the markings on the boxes indicate they were likely initially delivered to the Kenyan authorities under contract AMI/KEN/099/2023.

In 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that RSF appeared to be using this Chinese-made mortar ammunition. The video below shows two men, one adorned in RSF camouflage, unpacking 82mm HE Mortar Bomb Type PP87.

A United Nations Security Council report on January 15, 2024 pointed out that Kenyan airports were being used as transit routes to supply weapons and ammunition to Sudan— specifically to the RSF.

“The panel identified three main routes, still active to date, for RSF supplies. The main one was through eastern Chad. Since June, various flight-tracking experts have observed a heavy rotation of cargo planes coming from Abu Dhabi International Airport to Am Djarass airport in eastern Chad, with stops in regional countries such as Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda,” the report reads.

Our investigation reviewed flight records and identified several Ilyushin cargo planes that followed routes similar to those mentioned in the UN report, but was not able to confirm the nature of the flights passing through Kenyan airports.

Ilyushin Il-76 is a versatile, four-engine turbofan airlifter designed in the Soviet Union in 1967 as a commercial freighter.

It is known for its ability to transport heavy machinery to remote locations, and has been used in various civilian and military roles.

We observed most cargo planes from the United Arab Emirates switched off their transponders while approaching and exiting Kenya’s airspace towards Chad.

According to media reports, Ilyushin cargo planes have been previously implicated in arms smuggling and sanctions violations beyond Sudan, notably in Libya, where the planes were reported to switch off their transponders while smuggling weapons.

And while we were not able to confirm what the flights were transporting, on May 3, a cargo plane was bombed by the SAF at Nyala Airport while transporting military equipment for the RSF, according to media reports.

The plane was piloted by a Kenyan identified as Captain Michael George Oluoch Nyamodi.

Justin Lynch, the Managing Director of Conflict Insights Group and a Sudan researcher, says the discovery of the crates of ammunition labelled Kenya is further evidence of Nairobi’s political and logistical support to the RSF.

He pointed out the UAE has used Kenya and other African states as a political and logistical hub to support the RSF.

“It seems hardly a coincidence that RSF public conferences in Nairobi were immediately followed by a $1.5 billion loan from the UAE and a surge in suspicious UAE-to-RSF shipments transiting through Kenya.”

The public conference he is referring to is one that happened on February 18, 2025 when the RSF deputy commander— who is also Hemedti’s brother— Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, led a big meeting at the Kenyatta International Convention Centre (KICC) in Nairobi.

The RSF and its allies met at the heart of the Kenyan capital, some five kiometres from State House, to form a parallel government of Sudan.

The move was met with a lot of backlash from the Sudan transitional government and the military, which accused Kenya of undermining its sovereignty.

Kenya’s Foreign Affairs ministry, through the Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi, denied allegations that Nairobi is supporting a parallel government led by RSF.

“The convening of this dialogue forum in our capital, Nairobi, or elsewhere in Kenya, neither equates to endorsing the outcome of the forum nor constitutes the formation of an exile government, as has been alleged.” his statement read in part.

Sudan, however, retaliated by stopping imports of Kenyan tea and recalling its ambassador.

According to the United Nations, any form of support that enables the conflict in Sudan— be it political endorsement, covert arms transfers, or hosting RSF leaders — directly undermines ongoing international efforts to end the war.

Such actions not only violate existing arms embargoes but also breach long-standing diplomatic protocols meant to prevent further destabilisation in the region.

The US has also voiced strong concerns, warning that Kenya’s association with the RSF could jeopardise its diplomatic standing.

Washington DC has hinted at the possibility of sanctions or the withdrawal of key development and security assistance should Nairobi continue down this path.

“The US is deeply concerned by reports that the RSF and aligned actors have signed a ‘transitional constitution’ for Sudan,” the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs cautioned on March 5.

“Attempts to establish a parallel government are unhelpful for peace and security and risk further instability and de facto partition of the country.”

The African Union has echoed these warnings, stating that Kenya’s perceived alignment with one of the warring factions could sabotage regional mediation efforts and weaken collective peace-building frameworks.

As part of this investigation, the Nation reached out to several parties for their responses, including Kenya’s Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Sudanese Embassy in Nairobi, and the Kenya Airports Authority.

The Defence ministry replied to our enquiry on June 12, requesting to review our evidence before issuing a response.

We shared the forensic evidence, and three days later, hours to publication of this investigation, the ministry responded, distancing itself from the arsenal that was clearly marked as “MOD-KENYA”, with contract numbers to boot.

“We appreciate your reply to our request for photographs of the crates indicated and ammunition lot numbers to ascertain the claims,” the ministry said.

“Upon examination of the photographs provided, we wish to state that we do not recognise the crates nor the inscriptions on them.”

It continued: “The Kenya Ordinance Factory Corporation and by extension, the Ministry is alive to the sensitive nature of the ammunition it manufactures and as a result, it has clear records of its supplies within and beyond Kenya. Alongside this, and to guarantee public safety, audits of the factory's operations are frequently conducted by the managing and external oversight authorities”.

MOD did not directly address the specific details on the crates found in Salha, Omdurman, including names of the products, contract numbers, batch numbers, and case numbers.

“The Ministry of Defence, therefore, distances itself from the allegations you sent earlier. Further, we remain fully committed to upholding the rule of law and continue to operate strictly within the mandate granted by the Constitution and applicable authorisations.”

The other parties had not responded to our questions and interview requests by the time of going to Press.

But for a country that once made spirited efforts to stop the bloodbath in Sudan, Kenya now finds itself at risk of becoming entangled in the war — with real consequences.